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in any way as legislative history in construing or applying, any 
provision of this Act that relates to Wards Cove-business neces-
sity I cumulation/ alternative business practice, 14 
Thank you for using AT&T. 
The first text could once be read-can perhaps still be read-as 
a fountain of infinite meaning; the last statement is properly under-
stood not as a text, but as a literally mindless and therefore semanti-
cally meaningless utterance: a product of bureaucratic imperatives 
rather than of any signifying agent.ts 
And as for that atrocious middle sentence? No doubt a pla-
toon of dauntless hermeneuticians are already at work, striving to 
make it the best legal utterance it can be. Nevertheless, we should 
consider the possibility that, at the end of the millennium, amid the 
soulless machines that construct our bureaucratized texts, the law's 
words may not be like our words after all. 
DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. By H.W. Perry, 
Jr.t Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: Harvard Uni-
versity Press. 1991. Pp. ix, 308 (including appendix). $39.95. 
Dan T. Coenen 2 
When Phil Frickey asked me to review Deciding to Decide, he 
predicted I would not be able to set the book down. He was right. 
Forged from firsthand interviews with five Supreme Court Justices 
and 64 former Supreme Court clerks, H.W. Perry's book provides a 
fascinating inside look at the Court's case-selection process. The 
book was of special interest to me both because I once served as a 
law clerk and because I did so during the very time period Perry 
14. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1075. 
15. As Joseph Vining puts it, "Words themselves cannot speak." For a fascinating 
meditation on the implications of bureaucratic processes for the production and interpreta-
tion of legal texts, see Joseph Vining, The Authoritative and the Authoritarian 26 (U. of Chi. 
Press, 1986). 
I. Associate Professor of Government, Harvard University. 
2. Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia. Copyright © 1993, Dan T. 
Coenen. The author thanks the following friends who commented on this review: Peter J. 
Kalis, Geoffrey P. Miller, William J. Murphy, Robert V. Percival, Paul Schectman, James C. 
Smith, David 0. Stewart, Michael J. Wahoske and Rebecca H. White. 
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focused on in his research.3 The book, however, is of such quality 
and interest that it deserves a far wider audience than the strange 
stratum of readers I represent. 
Three points about the book should be made up front. First, 
its author is a political scientist. Having read this far, some of my 
comrades at the bar will promptly scratch this volume from their 
bedside book list. They shouldn't. Perry shows a sensitivity to law-
yers, to lawyering and to the lawyerly aspects of Supreme Court 
decisionmaking. He also minimizes (although he falls short of 
avoiding altogether) the jargon and analytic overkill that too often 
mar the writings of political scientists and legal academicians alike.4 
Second, the author's distinctive approach to his subject de-
serves commendation. The book is built around direct quotations-
443 of them according to my own unofficial count--of statements 
made by the interviewed Justices and clerks to Perry under a pledge 
of anonymity. Problems lurk in basing research on unidentified 
sources; there is no way, after all, to double-check whether clerk 
"C34" said what clerk "C34" is said to have said. Unlike its distant 
cousin The Brethren, however, this book will leave behind few sus-
picions that confidentially supplied information has been recast or 
presented out of context. The book does contain some useful cock-
tail-party materiaLs But a discernible effort to soft-pedal the sensa-
tional, together with the inherent plausibility of the statements 
Perry has collected, signals that this work reflects an appropriate 
sense of scholarly rigor. 
Third, and somewhat surprisingly, the book concentrates on 
the Supreme Court's case-selection operations more than a decade 
3. Perry's study concentrates on the period spanning OT 1976 through OT 1980. I 
clerked for Justice Blackmun during OT 1979. For the record, Perry did not interview me. 
4. For illustrations of these same tendencies, one need only consult the prior work of 
the author of this review. (Mea culpa!) 
5. One Justice, for example, was less than wholly complimentary about Chief Justice 
Burger's handling of the conference "discuss list": "Some [cases] that the chief justice puts 
on, frankly I don't know why they are on, and sometimes he doesn't know .... That is one of 
the things that make me think his law clerks do it." The clerks of "Justice A" also are 
singled out for some bad press. Other clerks report that Justice A's clerks "treated the cert. 
pool more cavalierly than the others," (quoting "C62"), "were more persistently ideological" 
and seemed "uniquely unsympathetic" to in forma pauperis petitions (quoting C48). One 
clerk opined that this pattern might have reflected the fact that "Justice A is the only justice 
[she knew] who tried to pick clerks who were ideologically compatible with himself" (quot-
ing C47). Another clerk critical of Justice A's chambers, however, noted that "then again, 
when I was clerking on the Court, most of the clerks were a lot more liberal than their 
justices." Perry informs us that the Justices may consider the caliber of counsel in deciding 
whether to grant cert. We learn also that several D.C. circuit judges "often write a dissent to 
attract the attention of a particular justice." I was surprised to discover that, at least in 
former days, clerks outside the cert. pool sometimes would "go swimming" by consulting 
pool memos before advising their own non-pool Justices about pending petitions. 
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ago. Much has changed in the meantime, particularly in terms of 
Court personnel.6 It would be too much to say, however, that 
there has been a fundamental retooling of the Court's case-review 
process. The principal value of this book thus lies not in its offering 
of an interesting history, but in its potential to provide useful in-
sights about the workings of the Court today. 
I 
The key contribution of Perry's book comes from its collection 
of extensive information about the Justices' behavior in making cer-
tiorari decisions. Perry notes the well-known "Rule of Four," but 
also teaches us that the Court uses a "Rule of Five," a "Rule of 
Six," a "Rule of Just Four," and a practice of "Joining Three."1 
Perry explodes the myth that the Justices vote on the basis of "jun-
iority"; in fact, voting begins with the Chief Justice and then pro-
ceeds from the most senior to the most junior Justice. Perry also 
persuasively challenges the common belief that the Chief Justice 
wields a much stronger influence over Supreme Court agenda set-
ting than do his brother and sister Justices. In particular, although 
the Chief Justice first formulates the "discuss list" of cases slated for 
full consideration at conference, each associate Justice may single-
handedly and freely add to the list any of the cases that the Chief 
Justice has omitted. 
Perry's research shows that there is virtually no discussion of 
pending cert petitions among the Justices either before or at the 
Conference. In the pre-Conference period, "interchamber discus-
sion is rare." One Justice goes so far as to say that: "Never have I 
had anyone call me or suggest how I ought to vote." (Emphasis 
added.) As to conferring at the Conference itself, one Justice puts it 
6. The Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction also has been largely eliminated, see 
infra note 19, and there have been changes in the size of the cert pool, as well as in the 
practices of some cert pool participants. See infra notes 8 and 10. 
7. Perry describes the "Rule of Five" this way: "There are certain issues of law ... for 
which coalitions on the Court have rigidified into a 5-4 block. The minority block can mus-
ter the four votes to grant cert., but everyone on the Court knows that they will lose on the 
merits. The result is that the four do not insist that the case be heard. One area where this 
phenomenon of four dissenters has occurred is obscenity." The "Rule of Six" applies to 
summary dispositions on the merits; in particular, Perry's research reveals that the Court 
follows a convention requiring six votes, rather than five, to rule on the merits without brief-
ing and argument. The "Rule of Just Four" (my own term) refers to a "new norm [that] has 
recently developed" at the Court: "when a case has only four votes, the chief justice may ask 
if the case can be relisted to see if any of the four want to reconsider." Apparently, relisting 
in such circumstances is common. The practice of "Joining Three" is a middle-ground man-
ner of voting on cert that an individual Justice may use; instead of voting to grant or to deny, 
the Justice may vote to "join three" and thus supply the key vote to grant only if three other 
Justices desire plenary review. 
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this way: "When we go over [cert petitions], there is not a lot of 
time . . . . Most all of us have our ideas and they are pretty firm 
when we come in .... We generally just vote." 
Such descriptions will disappoint those who seek high drama in 
the operations of the Court. Indeed, Perry views his own mission 
largely in terms of "sensitiz[ing] the reader to the mundane nature 
of much of the agenda-setting process . . . . " At the same time, 
Perry neither minimizes the importance of that process nor misses 
the point that it incorporates controversial features. Two of those 
features-the extensive use of law clerks in the case-selection pro-
cess and the role played by "political considerations" as the Justices 
vote-are of special interest to Perry. 
II 
Perry observes that "one cannot talk about the agenda-setting 
process without talking about the law clerks." Clerks in all cham-
bers long have been involved in the certiorari process, and the clerks 
of eight of the Justices now combine their efforts in generating the 
elaborate work of the cert pool. s 
The basic operation of the pool is no secret.9 For each case 
before the Court, one pool memo is drafted by one clerk of one 
Justice who participates in the pool. The completed pool memo--
which, according to Perry, is usually two to five pages long-then is 
distributed to all other participating Justices' chambers. Today, 
participating Justices handle the circulated pool memo in two differ-
ent ways. Some Justices require one of their own clerks to review 
and provide a "markup" of each circulated pool memo before it 
goes to the Justice. In other chambers, the Justice reviews the pool 
memo with no markup and involves one of the Justice's own clerks 
only if a particular memo triggers an interest in a second look. 
Perry's research indicates that, in either event, Justices in very few 
cases consult the petition itself.w 
Is this a good way to run a railroad? Perry is skeptical. He 
wonders, in particular, whether the pool memo system produces the 
8. Here lies one significant change in the cert process in the last dozen years. Thus, in 
1980, only five Justices (Burger, White, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist) were members of 
the pool. Today, all the Court's members, except Justice Stevens, are pool participants. In-
terestingly, two of the Justices interviewed by Perry expressed concerned about expanding the 
size of the pool. See pp. 53-55. 
9. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: How It Was, How It Is 263-64 
(William Morrow, 1987) ("Supreme Court"). 
10. Notably, during the time period focused on by Perry in his research, all participat-
ing Justices required a markup. The emergence of some Justices who review pool memos 
without markups thus reflects another (and, in my view, undesirable) change in the cert pro-
cess during the last dozen years. 
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efficiencies it is designed to achieve in that it requires clerks to pre-
pare full-blown memos even for cases plainly not destined for ple-
nary review. He also floats the recurring question whether the cert 
pool vests too much power in recent law school graduates not ap-
pointed by the President, not confirmed by the Senate, and marked 
by a noticeable wetness behind the ears. 
My own view is that, all things considered, the cert pool works 
remarkably well. Indeed, the value of the pool lies in its creation of 
precisely the type of efficiencies that permit the Justices themselves 
to control the certiorari process. It may be that the cert pool does 
not create efficiencies for the clerks, for clerks do spend time on 
cases that are not certworthy. The important point, however, is 
that the pool creates enormous efficiencies for the Justices. It does 
so by providing in standardized fashion and concentrated form the 
key information from all papers filed in each case to the participat-
ing Justices themselves. The cert pool, moreover, generates benefits 
beyond efficiency. In effect, the pool ensures that at least one per-
son at the Court will thoroughly read all important cert-related pa-
pers in each case and reflect on them in a focused and relatively 
unhurried fashion. A proper sensitivity to the human beings who 
are litigants before the Court-including those who file long-shot 
petitions--counsels that no less than this measure of process should 
be afforded. 
More fundamentally, the cert pool contributes to the agenda-
setting process a heightened level of care and regularity that well 
serves the overriding end of generating sound cert rulings. A simple 
way in which the cert pool aids decisionmaking by the Justices is by 
systematizing the presentation to the Justices of basic information 
about each case: from what court the case arises; who authored 
that court's opinion; who else (if the case is from a circuit court) 
was on the panel; who, if anyone, was in dissent; whether and by 
whom any amicus brief was submitted; and whether the petition 
was timely filed. Perry's research teaches that all this information is 
relevant to the Justices, and the formal pool-memo system ensures 
that they receive it. Moreover, the key considerations that go into 
any cert ruling-"conflict with other courts, general importance, 
and perception that the decision is wrong in the light of Supreme 
Court precedent"-are few in number and concern the sort of es-
sentially objective "factors ... that a well-trained law clerk is capa-
ble of evaluating."11 The pool system also facilitates a salutary 
11. Rehnquist, Supreme Court at 266 (cited in note 9). Most important, as Perry ob-
serves: "Much of a clerk's time on cert. is spent trying to determine if there is indeed the 
conflict that the petition alleges." Because this exercise calls more for technical skill than 
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attention to detail that nine freelancing chambers probably could 
not provide. The focused attention of the pool-memo drafter, for 
example, is more likely to disclose beneath-the-surface procedural 
problems than the necessarily more superficial examination of a 
larger group of clerks, each of whom must wade through ten times 
more petitions. 
Another advantage of the pool system is that it generates a for-
mal written memorandum for each filed case that, in addition to 
identifying the facts and the contentions of the parties, sets forth a 
proposed result and supporting reasons. Each such memo then is 
reviewed by a number of other clerks, the memo writer's own Jus-
tice, and all other Justices participating in the pool. Apart from 
providing an elaborate safeguard against oversights and misjudg-
ments by the memo writer, this system both facilitates an efficient 
form of "dialogue" about cases and creates a powerful incentive for 
the initial memo writer to do careful and honest work. As Perry 
has learned, law clerks are, by and large, hard-driven high achievers 
who develop profound loyalties to their own Justices; to such per-
sons, producing written work that brings disrepute on themselves 
and their chambers is little less than a heart-stopping prospect. In 
addition, because clerks spend only one short year at the Court, 
they are largely immune from the ennui and resulting carelessness 
that long-term exposure to the details of cert work might bring.12 
Most important, the memo writer's work produces an articu-
lated line of reasoning (indeed, two lines of reasoning if it triggers a 
markup) to which each participating Justice must consciously re-
spond. Having to deal with a pointed written analysis-more so 
than leafing through a stack of papers or chatting hurriedly with a 
clerk-forces the Justice to focus on and formulate with some care 
her or his own thoughts about each case. In short, the cert pool, 
like other sound governmental structures, takes advantage of natu-
ral human tendencies, and imposes a series of checks on key partici-
pants in the decisionmaking process. 
There is, I suspect, a widespread belief among practitioners 
that the certiorari process is not a careful one, given the discretion-
prowess of judgment or responsiveness to a particular Justice's policy concerns, it is well 
suited to being carried out by the pool memo drafter in the context of the cert-pool structure. 
12. Another former clerk, who wrote to me about an earlier draft of this review, ex-
pressed much the same point of view: "One of the biggest surprises to me when we were 
clerking was the extraordinary care given to the processing of cert petitions. I had assumed 
that the sheer numbers of petitions would guarantee that many worthwhile cases fell through 
the cracks. Yet I had the clear impression that this simply did not happen. Perhaps that was 
a product of the cert pool working remarkably well, as you indicate. By implicitly forcing the 
authors of pool memos to articulate some reason for denying cert, the pool guaranteed that 
someone took great care in reviewing each individual petition." 
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ary nature of cert decisions, the Court's enormous caseload, and the 
greater visibility and perceived importance of merits rulings and 
opinion writing. My own strong sense, however, is that the 
Supreme Court's cert work is conducted with considerable care. In-
deed, I am tempted to say (particularly now that it is so common 
for lower appellate courts to decide cases without argument, with-
out publication, and sometimes without opinion) that the Supreme 
Court's certiorari process affords no less meaningful procedural 
protection than most litigants receive in most merits decisions in 
most American appellate courts.IJ 
The cert process, after all, involves an elaborate montage of 
procedures. The cert pool ensures that each case is considered by 
eight Justices in a regularized process built on a focused, written 
assessment made by an observer who has strong incentives to do 
good work. The double-checking of pool memos by clerks in partic-
ipating Justices' chambers, together with the existence of one Jus-
tice who operates entirely outside the pool, provides a safeguard 
against undue reliance on an incomplete or misleading memo writ-
ten by a single clerk. In contrast to the situation often faced by 
lower appellate courts, the Supreme Court usually has at least one 
useful lower court opinion, and sometimes two or three, to help illu-
mine the issues in the case. The formulation of the "discuss list" 
concentrates judicial attention on the most debatable cases, and the 
ability to file dissents from cert denials further concentrates judicial 
attention on key cases and cuts down on casualness in making cert 
decisions. The Supreme Court, unlike other courts, is often able to 
avail itself of the expert views of the Solicitor General when trouble-
some cases arise. Perhaps most important, all of this happens in the 
context of a nine-member decisionmaking body. Given the size of 
this body, as well as the incentives and competence of its support 
staff, it will be a rare case that, although deserving of certiorari, falls 
through the adjudicatory cracks. 
Despite these accolades for the current cert system, the Justices 
might profitably consider one significant reform. After drafting this 
essay, I distributed it to a number of my co-clerks from the October 
1979 term. One of these readers, for whose judgment I have the 
highest regard, suggested I was too sanguine in my appraisal of 
agenda-setting process. Recognizing that current safeguards "prob-
ably, usually work," he nonetheless expressed concern about the 
13. Of course, my point here is not that the Court at this stage scrutinizes the merits as 
carefully as do lower courts that actually rule on the merits. Rather, my point is that the 
Court considers the certworthiness of cases as fairly and fully as lower appellate courts ex-
amine the merits. 
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diffusion of responsibility that comes from allowing all but one of 
the Justices to participate in the pool, particularly when some Jus-
tices do not even involve their own clerks in double-checking other 
clerks' work. "The glory of the Court," he urged, "always has been 
that it does its own work; I think the current 8-Justice cert pool 
undermines that glory." He went on "grudgingly" to suggest that a 
proper accommodation might support "a structure of three cert 
pools of three justices each." 
This fascinating proposal is one I had not previously consid-
ered, although I would reject it because a three-Justice pool strikes 
me as too small to give each memo drafter enough time to deal 
adequately with each case. But why not two cert pools of/our Jus-
tices each? A two-pool system would directly address the central 
problem of putting too much responsibility in any single clerk's 
hands. At least sometimes, it would expand appreciably the pre-
conference "dialogue" over cert petitions by causing different sets of 
Justices to look in somewhat different ways at potentially 
certworthy cases. A two-pool system would provide an added in-
centive for each memo drafter to do careful work, since each clerk's 
work would become subject to direct comparison with the work of 
another clerk. Finally, a four-Justice pool would not seem too small 
in size to operate successfully. The pool, after all, operated success-
fully for more than half a decade with only five Justices participat-
ing in it.I4 
Of course, only the Justices, with their own first-hand knowl-
edge of the pool's operation, can judge whether a four-Justice pool 
could operate effectively today. The important point is that, if they 
believe it could, there are significant structural reasons for prefer-
ring two smaller cert pools to a single large one. 
III 
Perry's most intriguing commentary concerns the role of so-
called "political behavior" in cert voting. He opens his discussion 
of this topic by putting it in proper perspective: "The overwhelm-
ing impression I received from my research is that there is little 
bargaining and strategy in the cert. process." At the same time, 
Perry concludes, "[t]here is some ... and it is more than most of the 
clerks, and perhaps some of the justices, acknowledge." 
What is this "political behavior" of which Perry speaks? It is 
not the swapping of one vote for another, sometimes referred to as 
"horse trading" or "logrolling." "Not a single informant men-
14. See Rehnquist, Supreme Court at 263-64 (cited in note 9). 
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tioned anything resembling horse-trading, and many said explicitly 
that it never occurred." Perry wonders why. It is "more under-
standable," he opines, that Justices don't trade votes on the merits 
because "[t]hat strikes too close to the heart of our norm of 'jus-
tice.' " Because cert decisions say "nothing about the validity of a 
ruling below," however, Perry finds "unjustified" the pervasive 
"normative indignation" at the possibility of vote trading at the cer-
tiorari stage. 
Here, Perry's lack of attention to legal process values leads him 
to take a serious misstep. Although the certiorari decision does not 
set precedent, it has extraordinary importance for the human beings 
who are litigants before the Court: it either terminates the appeal 
process for the petitioner or opens the door for the petitioner to 
secure total victory on the merits. (In addition, at the least, a grant 
of certiorari exposes the respondent to all the expense, delay, and 
inconvenience of full-scale Supreme Court litigation.) For this rea-
son, vote-trading at the certiorari stage, as surely as at the merits 
stage, would offend the core legal principle that individual cases are 
to be individually decided based on their individual merits. 
This conclusion, however, merely leads to another, more subtle 
normative inquiry. As Perry explains, all Justices pursue so-called 
"defensive denials"-that is, they sometimes vote to deny cert out 
of concern that a grant will produce a bad precedent when the 
Court rules on the merits. As Perry observes: "It is interesting that 
every justice denounced and denied any logrolling on cert.; but all 
admitted that defensive denials occur. Most justices view defensive 
denials as an acceptable strategy; logrolling is an unacceptable strat-
egy to them all." The interesting question is why. 
Perry theorizes that this difference in attitude has arisen be-
cause the Justices "are strongly socialized not to allow outside influ-
ence." Thus "[t]he primary distinction is that logrolling involves 
two justices whereas a defensive denial involves one." Although 
this insight has merit, there is more to the matter than that. 
First, as already suggested, the central difficulty with cert-vote 
logrolling is that it ties together the disposition of two cases in viola-
tion of the core principle of case-specific judicial decisionmaking. 
Defensive denials, which concern a decision on how to vote on one 
case standing alone, are not affiicted with this vice. 1s 
15. It might be said in response that the defensively denying Justice violates the norm of 
case-specific decisionmak.ing by in effect trading the possibility of reversal in the petitioner's 
case for the benefits gained by other future litigants who otherwise will probably feel the 
effects of an unwanted precedent. Such a tradeoff, however, bears little resemblance to an 
out-and-out trade under which one Justice swaps her vote in an existing case for another 
Justice's changing his vote in another existing and unrelated case. It might even be said that 
1993] BOOK REVIEWS 189 
Second, defensive denials do not raise remotely the same risk of 
prejudice to the petitioner that a traded vote to grant raises for the 
respondent. The very reason the Justice makes a "defensive" vote 
to deny is because the Justice, although sympathetic to the peti-
tioner's position, believes the petitioner will lose on the merits. To 
be sure, the defensively denying Justice cannot be sure the petitioner 
will lose, and the vote to deny, if successful, removes any possibility 
the petitioner might win. On the other hand, averting a vote on the 
merits might be in even the petitioner's own best interest, at least if 
alternative channels of review (such as federal habeas corpus relief) 
remain open. 
Finally, as Perry himself points out, an acceptance of horse 
trading of cert votes could start the Court perambulating down the 
path toward horse trading votes on the merits. Countenancing de-
fensive denials carries no similar danger because the Justices cannot 
and do not vote "defensively" at the merits stage. In short, a toler-
ance of vote trading in the cert process would carry a far graver risk 
to the integrity of merits decisionmaking than does a tolerance of 
defensive denials. 
As Perry emphasizes, the "defensive denial" vote occurs only 
in the extraordinary case. The criteria applied in the usual case are 
not "political" in any sense. Sometimes the case is a "clear deny." 
So it is, under unwritten rules of practice, if a convicted criminal 
defendant petitions for cert based on a claim of insufficient evidence 
of guilt, ineffective assistance of counsel, or a defective Allen charge. 
The Court also will not review claims that are marked by proce-
dural complexities or are "fact specific" because they involve only 
application of settled doctrine to a nonrecurring cluster of 
circumstances. 
Perry aptly reminds us that "[w]ithout a doubt, the single most 
important generalizable factor in assessing certworthiness is the 
existence of a conflict or 'split' in the circuits." Of course, "there 
are conflicts, and there are conflicts." In much the manner that 
youngsters recite the Scout Law, Perry's panelists tell us that con-
flicts must be "genuine," "important," "ripe," "square" and "live." 
Conflicts should not be "tolerable," "trivial," "strained" or "involv-
ing some obscure provision of the Internal Revenue Code." Even if 
there is a conflict, the Court sometimes will deny cert to permit 
the defensively denying Justice, in deciding how to vote, is doing nothing more than scanning 
the future social consequences of the Court's action in the field of human activity the case 
concerns. Looking to such consequences is, moreover, something that Justices, with good 
reason, do all the time. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803) (Court 
votes to recognize judicial review in part because contrary rule would have the undesirable 
future consequence of "giving to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence"). 
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further "percolation" of a legal question in the lower courts or be-
cause the petitioned case presents a "bad vehicle" for considering an 
otherwise certworthy issue. 
Notwithstanding the lack of a conflict, the importance of an 
issue sometimes justifies review. Perry's informants saw illustra-
tions of this principle in the Nixon-tapes, Iranian-assets and draft-
registration cases. In some instances a foursome or more will vote 
to grant cert because of a lower court's "flagrant disregard for pre-
cedent" or because "a severe injustice occurred"-particularly, we 
are told, if the injured party is a child. Finally, some Justices play 
subject-matter favorites. We learn that the Court's westerners-
Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist and White-are "intensely inter-
ested" in water rights cases. According to Clerk C16, there is a 
Justice who feels "that the Court just should never deal with tax 
cases." There once "was a time when four members simply weren't 
interested in hearing Securities and Exchange Commission cases." 
One Justice deems Indian law cases "kind of fascinating." Another 
thinks "[t]here are a lot of boring administrative agency cases," 
while "all of the justices seemed to exhibit intense interest in First 
Amendment issues of all types." 
IV 
In the end, Perry cannot refrain from advancing a "decision 
model" that purports to reveal how these many forces interact in 
the judicial mind. Basically, according to Perry, each Justice in 
each nonfriviolous case makes a preliminary decision whether he or 
she "cares strongly about the outcome . . . on the merits." This 
decision determines whether the Justice moves into "outcome 
mode" -which focuses on tactical concerns--or "jurisprudential 
mode" -which focuses on "the types of things that one learns in 
law school." Emphasizing that each Justice sometimes uses each 
mode, Perry draws the following picture of how each Justice de-
cides how to vote in each case. 
1993] 
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There may be some limited value in this roadmap. In particu-
lar, it more accurately depicts how the Justices act than do simplis-
tic assertions that they care only about ultimate outcomes or never 
care about the merits at all. It also properly suggests the potential 
for differing philosophies toward the cert process, with some Jus-
tices focusing at least sometimes on error correction (particularly in 
the death-penalty context), while other Justices concentrate solely 
on resolving recurring doctrinal problems (particularly in light of 
the limited resources of the Court).I6 Beyond this, however, I sus-
16. Several persons who commented on this review suggested that I emphasize the im-
portance of the difference between an error-correction orientation and a national-law-harmo-
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pect that Perry's model is neither very enlightening nor even true to 
the data he has assembled. 
Consider, for example, the hypothetical Justice Z, who comes 
across a cert petition that challenges a circuit court's ruling that 
municipal truck mechanics do "safety sensitive" work and therefore 
may be subjected to drug-urine tests without a warrant or reason-
able suspicion.t7 Justice Z is a strong believer in privacy rights and 
is outraged by this result. Justice Z also thinks, however, that there 
is a 60- 40 chance a majority of the current Court will affirm the 
lower court if cert is granted. 
According to Perry's model, Justice Z will vote to deny unless 
he deems it "institutionally irresponsible" to do so. In fact, how-
ever, a purely tactical analysis might well lead Justice Z to vote for 
a grant. Justice Z, for example, might reason that the result below 
is so intolerable that it is worth fighting the odds to overturn it. 
Justice Z might be especially inclined to favor immediate review if a 
"law and order" president has just taken office so that a delay in 
reaching the issue only threatens to decrease the chances of prevail-
ing as more "conservative" Justices are appointed to the Court. 
Even absent such tactical concerns, Justice Z may vote to 
grant. Justice Z, for example, might say to himself something like 
this: "This is a close call on whether to take the case just to correct 
a bad outcome, but the issue will arise often and there is something 
of a conflict, so I suppose I'll vote to grant." Such a line of reason-
ing seems to me wholly plausible, and I find nothing in Perry's data 
that suggests it will never occur. Under Perry's model, however, 
such reasoning cannot happen, for Justice Z has entered "outcome 
mode" in which one considers "jurisprudential factors" only to the 
extent it is "institutionally irresponsible" not to take the case. 
This analysis of our hypothetical drug-test case raises at least 
three basic concerns about Perry's decisional model. It suggests, 
first, that the certiorari decision process may be too subtle to be 
captured in a series of simple yes-no answers. (The possibility of a 
tactical vote to grant, despite a 60- 40 chance of losing on the mer-
its, establishes that much.) It suggests also that the particular "yes-
no" categories fixed on in Perry's model may be too quirky and 
nebulous to have much utility. (Why should we say a loss-predict-
ing outcome-mode Justice will' grant only to avoid "institutional ir-
nizer orientation in the case-selection process. The difference between these approaches is 
extremely important, and I have written of it previously at some length. See Dan T. Coenen, 
To Defer or Not to Defer: A Study of Federal Circuit Court Deference to District Court Rul-
ings on State Law, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 899, 913-16 (1989). 
17. See generally Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
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responsibility"? What evidence supports that view? And, for that 
matter, what does it mean to be "institutionally irresponsible"?) Fi-
nally, the hypothetical suggests that the psychological wall of sepa-
ration Perry sees between tactical and nontactical considerations 
may well not exist. (Otherwise, Justice Z, who was very interested 
in the merits, would not have considered at all the recurring nature 
of the issue and the arguable circuit-court conflict in deciding to 
vote for review.) 
More fundamentally, Perry's model, and to some extent his en-
tire book, overlook or diminish important considerations in the cer-
tiorari process. For example, Rule 10 itself says it matters whether 
a circuit court has "decided a federal question in a way in conflict 
with a state court of last resort."ts Yet Perry's model does not 
mention this type of conflict. Perry gives no treatment at all to the 
important category of "held" cases-i.e., petitions held in abeyance 
pending disposition of another case on the merits. Perry's model 
also lays no weight on whether the case arises by appeal, rather than 
by petition, despite the admitted (though, in my view, greatly un-
derstated) relevance of this consideration.t9 Finally, Perry's model 
overlooks a factor he himself identifies as present in the decisional 
mix: the particular interest or lack of interest of a particular Justice 
in a particular area of law. (Sometimes Justices just wanna have 
fun.) 
It is true that the questions asked in Perry's model may be read 
broadly to take account of some of these considerations. It also is 
true that Perry appropriately acknowledges the great difficulty of 
constructing a perfect model of the case-review process. Most im-
portant, it surely is true that I know how much easier it is to throw 
rocks than to build a solid and pleasing edifice. 
In the final analysis, Perry has given us such an edifice in his 
study of Supreme Court agenda setting. I encourage him soon to 
put on his own agenda a similar examination of Supreme Court 
decisionmaking on the merits. 
18. U.S. S. Ct. Rule 10. 
19. Of course, this point is of limited practical significance today (as opposed to the 
time period focused on in Perry's research), because of Congress's removal in 1988 of virtu-
ally all mandatory Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. See generally Gerald Gunther, Con-
stitutional Law 52-53 (Foundation, 12th ed. 1991 ). 
